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A Farm Bill to Help Farmers Weather Climate Change
Peter H. Lehner* and Nathan A. Rosenberg**
Climate change affects farmers and ranchers more than 
almost any other sector. Agriculture depends on consistent 
weather patterns, and the more frequent droughts, floods, heat 
waves, pest attacks, and other impacts of climate change make an 
often uncertain activity even more so. A farm bill that focuses on 
the true long-terms interests of farmers would help producers slow 
climate change, while also helping them better prepare for the 
inevitable coming weather changes. Fortunately, many practices 
that help producers reduce their contribution to climate change 
also enhance their farms’ resilience to higher temperatures and 
more extreme weather. The farm bill should prioritize adoption 
of these climate-friendly practices. It’s time to decarbonize the 
farm bill. 
While this is a radical—or at least politically charged—
idea in the United States, other countries are beginning to treat 
agriculture as a major source of emissions1—and as a major 
pathway for reducing net emissions. Alongside the negotiations 
over the Paris Agreement on climate change in 2016, hundreds 
of countries, regional groups, and others joined in an initiative 
called “4/1000” to increase soil carbon stocks by 0.4 percent 
*  Senior Attorney and Director, Sustainable Food and Farming Program, Earthjustice.
** Adjunct professor, University of Arkansas School of Law. The authors thank 
Thomas Driscoll, Scott Faber, Greg Fogel, Sarah Saylor, and Seth Watkins for their 
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1  See, e.g., Eva Wollenberg et al., Reducing Emissions from Agriculture to Meet the 
2°C Target, 22 Global Change Biology 3859, 3860 (2016). Under the 2015 Paris 
Agreement of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, each 
country sets their own emission targets, while also planning and reporting their 
contribution. Id. So far at least 119 countries have pledged to reduce their agricultural 
greenhouse gas emissions in their statements of Intended Nationally Determined 
Contributions (“INDC”s). Id.
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every year.2 This could be enough to offset about 30 percent of 
global anthropogenic emissions.3 
The measures necessary to increase soil carbon stocks 
would also reduce nonpoint source water pollution and soil erosion, 
while increasing agricultural productivity, soil water carrying 
capacity, and drought resilience.4 With the reauthorization of the 
farm bill every five years, and perhaps as soon as 2018, the U.S. 
has an opportunity to incentivize practices that benefit producers 
as well as society more broadly.  This essay offers suggestions on 
how the farm bill can be reformed to accomplish this. Although 
it’s unlikely the 2018 farm bill will address climate change, it’s 
not too early to lay the foundation for 2023 and beyond. 
Moving beyond the 1938 Farm Bill
The structure and priorities of the farm bill still owe much 
to the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938.5 The 1938 Farm Bill 
compensated farmers for “soil conservation,” but, as observers at 
the time noted, the conservation component was largely a legal 
fiction, intended to ensure that the legislation, which primarily 
benefited large-scale commodity producers,6 passed constitutional 
2  Budiman Minasny, Soil Carbon per 4 Mille, 292 Geoderma 59, 82 (2017).
3  Id.; Contra A.J. VandenBygaart, Letter to the Editor, Comments on Soil Carbon 4 
per Mille, 309 Geoderma 113, 113-14 (2018) (arguing that Minasny et al. overstate soil 
carbon sequestration’s ability to mitigate climate change). 
4  Rattan Lal, Sequestering Carbon in Soils of Agro-Ecosystems, 36 Food Pol’y 
S33, S36 (2011); Rattan Lal, Sequestering Carbon and Increasing Productivity by 
Conservation Agriculture, 70 J. Soil & Water Conservation 55A, 55A, 58A-59A 
(2015). 
5  Wayne D. Rasmussen, New Deal Agricultural Policies after Fifty Years, 68 Minn. 
L. Rev. 353, 358-359 (1984); Douglas R. Hurt, Problems of Plenty: The American 
Farmer in the Twentieth Century 151 (2002); Devan A. McGranahan et al., A 
Historical Primer on the US Farm Bill: Supply Management and Conservation Policy, 
68 J. Soil & Water Conservation 67A, 69A (2013).
6  See, e.g., Pete Daniel, Lost Revolutions: The South In the 1950s 41-42 
(Univ. of North Carolina Chapel Hill Press 2000); Charles Kenneth Roberts, 
The Farm Security Administration and Rural Rehabilitation in the South 
ix, 29 (Univ. of Tennessee Press 2015); Gilbert C. Fite, Cotton Fields No More: 
Southern Agriculture 1865-1980 143 (Univ. of Kansas Press 1984) (discussing 
the Soil Conservation and Domestic Allotment Act, which provided the model for the 
Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938). The 1938 law also strengthened the influence 
of the conservative American Farm Bureau Federation. David Brody, On the Failure 
of U.S. Radical Politics: A Farmer-Labor Analysis, 22 Indus. Rel. 156 (1983).
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muster.7 Subsequent farm bills have followed this pattern, using 
conservation as a means to support large-scale, capital-intensive 
agriculture, but rarely treating it as end in itself. This has resulted 
in a farm safety net that places the interests of agribusiness over 
farmers and conservation programs that often do not do enough to 
strengthen the environment or rural communities. 
This history must help guide the decarbonization of the 
farm bill. Some agricultural practices may, in the short-term, help 
reduce greenhouse gas emissions, but in the long-run shore up 
an industrial model of agriculture that is ultimately less climate-
friendly.8 Moreover, a successful, climate-friendly farm bill would 
not only include programs designed to reduce emissions and 
increase soil health, but it would also work to change the political 
dynamics of farm communities. Without building a robust base of 
support in rural America by targeting benefits at a wide range of 
people—rather than a small group of very large, often corporate 
farms—any climate-friendly programs will soon face co-option 
or dissolution. 
Both the farm safety net and conservation programs must 
be designed with these long-term goals in mind. Some proposals 
to make conservation and research programs more “flexible” and 
financially secure by increasing the private sector’s involvement,9 
7  Grant McConnell, The Decline of Agrarian Democracy 129 (3d ed. 1977); 
Paul W. Ward, The AAA Puts on False Whiskers, The Nation, Jan. 22, 1936, at 93 
(describing the rush to pass legislation basing farm benefits on the pretext of ‘soil 
conservation’ rather than ‘crop control’ in order to escape judicial veto). See United 
States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 68 (1936) (finding the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933 
unconstitutional because regulated and controlled agricultural production, invading 
the reserved rights of the states).
8  See, e.g., Open Letter from Civil Society on the Global Alliance for Climate-Smart 
Agriculture, Climate Smart Agriculture Concerns (July 2014), http://www.
climatesmartagconcerns.info/english.html; Ben Lilliston, The Clever Ambiguity 
of Climate Smart Agriculture, Inst. for Agric. and Trade Policy (Dec. 4, 2015), 
https://www.iatp.org/blog/201512/the-clever-ambiguity-of-climate-smart-agriculture.
9  See, e.g., Regional Conservation Partnership Program Improvement Act of 
2017, S. 1966, 115th Cong. (2017) (granting private entities more control over how 
conservation funds are spent); Callie Eideberg, How Congress Can Help Farmers 
Stay Profitable and Resilient, Envtl. Def. Fund (Feb. 27, 2017), http://blogs.edf.
org/growingreturns/2017/02/27/how-congress-can-help-farmers-stay-profitable-and-
resilient/ (proposing to strengthen farm bill conservation programs through private 
sector investment and collaboration). 
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for example, while advertised as a win-win for farmers and the 
environment,10 would in fact harm both.11 Many of the largest 
sources of private funding have very different interests than 
environmental stewardship or rural communities. Thus, ranking 
research funding applications higher if the applicants secure 
corporate matches would in the long-run advance the interests 
of agribusiness over those of independent farmers and the 
environment. 
Fortunately, it may be politically advantageous to 
decarbonize the farm bill with a long-term focus, prioritizing the 
public interest with the input of rural communities and a diverse 
range of farmers. Agribusiness is increasingly concentrated: Just 
four companies sold over 85 percent of the beef in the U.S.;12 five 
companies slaughter almost 70 percent of the swine;13 with recent 
mergers, just three companies control over 60 percent of agro-
chemical and seed sales internationally.14 This concentration, as 
well as the concentration of payments under federal farm programs, 
15 creates tensions in farm country,16 and thus a political opening. 
10  See, e.g., Callie Eideberg, The Next Farm Bill Can Jump Start Conservation. 
Here’s How., Envtl. Def. Fund (Oct. 24, 2017), http://blogs.edf.org/
growingreturns/2017/10/24/farm-bill-rcpp-conservation-innovation/ (describing the 
Regional Conservation Partnership Program Improvement Act of 2017 as “a win-win 
for farmers and the environment.”). 
11  See generally Joshua Ulan Galperin, Trust Me I’m a Pragmatist: A Partially 
Pragmatic Critique of Pragmatic Activism, 42 Colum. J. Envtl. L. 426 (2017) 
(discussing the pitfalls of relying on ‘win-win solutions’ as a means of environmental 
protection).
12  Kristina Johnson & Samuel Fromartz, NAFTA’s ‘Broken Promises’: These Farmers 
Say They Got the Raw End of the Trade Deal, NPR (Aug. 7, 2017), https://www.npr.
org/sections/thesalt/2017/08/07/541671747/nafta-s-broken-promises-these-farmers-
say-they-got-the-raw-end-of-trade-deal. 
13  The Agribusiness Accountability Initiative, Hogging the Market: How 
Powerful Meat Packers are Changing our Food System and what We Can Do 
About It 2, http://www.ase.tufts.edu/gdae/Pubs/rp/AAI_Issue_Brief_4.pdf. 
14  Merge-Santo: New Threat to Food Sovereignty, ETC Grp. (Mar. 23, 2016), http://
www.etcgroup.org/content/merge-santo-new-threat-food-sovereignty. 
15  The largest 7 percent of producers owns 60 percent of the harvested cropland, 
receives almost half of all government farm payments, and takes in almost 90 percent 
of all net farm income. See U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 2012 Census of Agriculture 
94, 98, 100 tbl. 65 (2014), https://www.agcensus.usda.gov/Publications/2012/Full_
Report/Volume_1,_Chapter_1_US/usv1.pdf (Calculated by the authors using data 
from the Census of Agriculture). 
16  See, e.g., Ctr. for Rural Affairs, May/June 2013 Study among Rural/Small-
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Advancing carbon-sequestering policies could prove popular 
in many rural areas if those policies were designed to benefit a 
broader range of farmers than current programs, improve water 
quality and local landscapes, and help reverse land consolidation. 
Reforming farm bill programs
The farm bill is a massive omnibus bill. Its most recent 
iteration, the Agricultural Act of 2014, ran to 357 pages, amended 
16 previous farm bills, and authorized almost a trillion dollars 
of spending.17 Because the bill is typically so large, we do not 
attempt to provide a comprehensive guide to decarbonizing it.18 
Instead we focus on six critical steps that Congress should take 
to make future farm bills better for rural communities and the 
climate. 
Town Americans 12 (2013) http://files.cfra.org/pdf/Poll-of-Rural-Voters-Toplines-
by-Income.pdf. A 2013 survey of 804 registered voters in rural America found that 68 
percent agreed or strongly agreed with the statement that “[t]oo much of federal farm 
subsidies go to the largest farms, hurting smaller family farms.” See id. Nationally, 
agribusiness companies are among the least popular corporations; Harris Poll’s annual 
poll of the 100 most visible corporations in the United States, for example, ranked 
Monsanto as having the fourth worst reputation. Harris Poll: Corporate Reputation 
Politically Polarized as Companies Wrestle with Taking a Stand for Their Values, 
Cision PR News Wire (Feb. 9, 2017), https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/
harris-poll-corporate-reputation-politically-polarized-as-companies-wrestle-with-
taking-a-stand-for-their-values-300404867.html. A 2017 survey of 1,506 registered 
voters nationwide also found that 90 percent of voters had either “very serious 
concerns” or “somewhat serious concerns” about the potential merger of Monsanto 
and Bayer. Memorandum from Public Policy Polling to Interested Parties, 90 Percent 
of Voters Nationwide Concerned about Potential Merger of Monsanto and Bayer; 
Overwhelming Majority Say Merger Will Result in Harm to Consumers, Farmers 
(June 14, 2017), https://1bps6437gg8c169i0y1drtgz-wpengine.netdna-ssl.com/wp-
content/uploads/2017/legacy/National_Monsanto_Memo_6.9.17_002.pdf. 
17  Letter from Douglas W. Elmendorf, Director, Congressional Budget Office, to 
Frank D. Lucas, Chairman, U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Agriculture 
(Jan. 28, 2014), https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/113th-congress-2013-2014/
costestimate/hr2642lucasltr00.pdf. 
18  See generally Peter Lehner & Nathan Rosenberg, Legal Pathways to Carbon-
Neutral Agriculture, 47 Envtl. L. Rep. 10845 (2017) (comprehensive approach 
to decarbonizing farm programs). The Farm Bill Law Enterprise (“FBLE”) and 
the National Sustainable Agriculture Coalition (“NSAC”) are also independently 
releasing comprehensive sets of recommendations designed to make the farm bill 
more sustainable and equitable. See generally Broad Leib et al., Farm Bill Law 
Enterprise, Diversified Agricultural Economies (2018), http://www.farmbilllaw.
org/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/FBLE_Diversified-Agricultural-Economies_Final.
pdf; Nat’l Sustainable Agric. Coalition, An Agenda for the 2018 Farm Bill 
(2017), http://sustainableagriculture.net/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/NSAC-2018-
Farm-Bill-Platform-FINAL.pdf. 
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1.  Expand research and extension service on climate-
friendly practices.
Over the last decade, public spending on agricultural 
research has dropped by almost one-third19 and less than two percent 
of the remaining funding is devoted to diversified systems,20 which 
offer the greatest climate and environmental benefits.21 Given the 
critical need both for greater study and demonstration of many 
climate-friendly practices, Congress should restore sufficient 
funding to U.S. Department of Agriculture (“USDA”) research 
programs and require that at least half of the department’s research 
expenditures support climate-friendly practices or systems.
Similarly, extension services have proven remarkably 
effective at disseminating and perpetuating new agricultural 
practices.22 Yet funding is way down and there is inadequate focus 
on climate-friendly practices such as the use of cover crops, prairie 
grass strips, perennial crops, and buffer zones along streams and 
lakes. Congress should both restore funding for extension to at 
least $900 million annually, and, perhaps building on the existing 
(for now) Climate Hubs, devote the additional funding to support 
practices that will both increase soil carbon stocks and improve 
farm resilience to extreme weather. 23 
19  Matthew Clancy et al., U.S. Agricultural R&D in an Era of Falling Public Funding, 
U.S. Dep’t of Agric, Econ. Res. Serv. (Nov. 10, 2016), https://www.ers.usda.gov/
amber-waves/2016/november/us-agricultural-rd-in-an-era-of-falling-public-funding/. 
20  Marcia DeLonge et al., Investing in the Transition to Sustainable Agriculture, 55 
Envtl. Sci. & Pol’y 266, 267 (2016).
21  See id.
22  See, e.g., Irwin Feller, Technology Transfer, Public Policy, and the Cooperative 
Extension Service—OMB Imbroglio, 6 J. Pol’y Analysis & Mgmt. 307, 307 (1987) 
(“The Cooperative Extension Service has come to represent the best of both an 
articulated but decentralized political arrangement and of a technology transfer 
system.”); George McDowell, Engaged Universities: Lessons from the Land Grant 
Universities and Extension, 585 Annals Am. Acad. Pol. & Soc. Sci. 31, 35-36 (2003).
23  Congress should also provide permanent baseline funding for the USDA National 
Agroforestry Center, while increasing its budget to at least $10 million. It was 
originally appropriated $5 million by Congress in the 1990 Farm Bill; however it 
typically receives about $1 million, despite agroforestry’s demonstrated potential 
to rapidly increase carbon sequestration. See Food, Agriculture, Conservation, and 
Trade Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101–624, §1243, 104 Stat. 3546 (1990).
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2. Enforce conservation limitations—and place new ones 
on payment size
In order to remain eligible for a number of important 
federal farm programs, farmers are prohibited from producing 
agricultural products on highly erodible land without a conservation 
plan,24 or from doing so on unconverted wetlands under any 
circumstances.25 These requirements, known as “conservation 
compliance,” apply to the crop insurance program, each of the 
conservation programs, and many smaller programs. They offer 
potentially important climate benefits because conventional 
farming on highly erodible land and wetlands results in significant 
greenhouse gas emissions.26 
These requirements must be strengthened, however, to 
ensure that government funds protect—rather than undermine—
soil and water quality and that farmers implementing sound 
stewardship practices are not placed at a disadvantage. Congress 
should require operators and landowners to plan and implement 
conservation systems for all land planted with annual crops in 
order to be eligible for farm program benefits and crop insurance 
subsidies.27 These conservation systems must help protect carbon 
stocks by ensuring that soil erosion on annually planted cropland 
does not exceed the soil loss tolerance level—the maximum annual 
rate of soil erosion possible without causing a decline in long-term 
24  16 U.S.C. §§ 3811-3812 (2014).
25  16 U.S.C. § 3821. Wetlands drained or filled before December 23, 1985 are not 
protected. 16 U.S.C. § 3822(b)(1)(A).
26  Wetlands are estimated to emit between 405 and 1215 metric tons of CO2 eq. per acre 
when converted to agricultural land. Richard Plevin et al., Greenhouse Gas Emissions 
from Biofuels’ Indirect Land Use Change Are Uncertain But May Be Much Greater 
than Previously Estimated, 44 Envtl. Sci. & Tech. 8015, 8018 (2010), https://pubs.
acs.org/doi/ipdf/10.1021/es101946t. 
27  See generally Food & Farm Act, H.R. 4425, 115th Cong. §§ 201-206 (2017) 
(proposing to extend conservation plan requirements to all cropland planted with row 
crops, not just highly erodible land as under the current law); Nat’l Sustainable 
Agric. Coalition, supra note18, at 32-33, 44-45, 84 (discussing the importance 
of comprehensive conservation plans for effective stewardship); Envtl. Working 
Grp., Less Farm Pollution, More Clean Water: An Agenda for Conservation 
in the 2018 Farm Bill 2 (2017), https://cdn3.ewg.org/sites/default/files/u352/
EWG_Report_Conservation_C06.pdf?_ga=2.167498046.187388472.1525043603-
1751440026.1525043603, (advocating for extending conservation plan requirements 
to all annually tilled land).
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productivity;28 address gully erosion, which is responsible for 
up to 40 percent of soil loss in the United States;29 and maintain 
waterway buffers to reduce runoff and nitrous oxide emissions.30 
These steps will greatly improve soil and water quality locally 
and throughout the country, resulting, among other benefits, in 
significantly reduced climate impacts.   
The USDA Inspector General has also found that the 
department has failed to consistently enforce current conservation 
requirements.31 Congress should adequately fund conservation 
compliance enforcement and increase USDA’s technical 
assistance capacity to ensure that providers know how to comply.32 
Finally, Congress should require USDA to report compliance and 
enforcement data to Congress, allowing policymakers and the 
public to evaluate USDA’s enforcement efforts.33 
Just as USDA programs should, at a minimum, preserve 
environmentally sensitive land, they should also protect small- and 
medium-scale farms, which provide a number of services to rural 
28  See generally H.R. 4425 (proposing to require conservation plans to maintain soil 
erosion levels at or below the soil loss tolerance level); Nat’l Sustainable Agric. 
Coalition, supra note 18, at 36 (urging Congress to require conservation plans for 
highly erodible land to achieve soil erosion levels at or below the soil tolerance level); 
Envtl. Working Grp., supra note 27 (recommending that Congress integrate the soil 
tolerance level into conservation plans).
29  See generally H.R. 4425 (proposing to require conservation plans to address 
ephemeral gully erosion); Nat’l Sustainable Agric. Coalition, supra note 18, at 37 
(discussing USDA’s inadequate efforts to reduce gully erosion and proposing reforms); 
Envtl. Working Grp., supra note 27, at 3 (recommending that conservation plans 
prevent gully erosion).
30  See generally H.R. 4425 (requiring 50 feet of perennial vegetation between annually 
tilled land and intermittent or perennial waterways); Envtl. Working Grp., supra 
note 27 (proposing that the 2018 Farm Bill require conservation plans to include 50 
feet of perennial vegetation between annually tilled land and waterways).
31  The report also found that the agency’s auditing process had completely bypassed at 
least 10 states in 2015, apparently in error. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., USDA Monitoring 
of Highly Erodible Lands and Wetland Conservation Violations, Audit Rep. 
50601-0005-31 3 (2016), https://www.usda.gov/oig/webdocs/50601-0005-31.pdf; 
see also Laurie Ristino & Gabriela Steier, Losing Ground: A Clarion Call for Food 
System Reform to Ensure a Food Secure Future, 42 Colum. J. Envtl. L. 59, 96-102 
(2016) (discussing flaws in conservation compliance enforcement).
32  See Farm Bill Law Enterprise, supra note 27 (detailing possible improvements in 
enforcement and compliance within the conservation compliance regime).
33  Both FBLE and NSAC also recommend mandated collection and reporting of 
conservation compliance data. See Farm Bill Law Enterprise, supra note 27; Nat’l 
Sustainable Agric. Coalition, supra note18, at 36.
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communities,34 reduce wealth inequality,35 and have been found 
to be disproportionately likely to adopt sustainable practices.36 
Currently, however, USDA programs disproportionately favor 
large-scale producers and help drive land consolidation. The 
top 7 percent of producers, for example, received almost half of 
all government farm payments in 2012.37 While some programs 
currently cap payments, many, including crop insurance, do not, 
and existing caps are too high. Congress should place a cap on 
payments across all farm safety net and conservation programs 
at $150,000 or lower, and use the resulting savings to increase 
support for sustainable small- and medium-sized farms.
3. Require crop insurance providers to base premiums on 
soil health
In an era when the public is growing increasingly 
skeptical of industrial agriculture and farm subsidies, crop 
insurance has become a politically palatable way for the federal 
government to subsidize large-scale operations. The program is 
portrayed as, and often perceived to be, a safety net for farmers 
in the event of catastrophic crop failure. While about 16 percent 
of federal crop insurance contracts are limited to this type of 
protection, the vast majority, 84 percent, also include revenue 
protections.38 These revenue-based policies guarantee enrolled 
farmers a certain level of income regardless of market prices or 
their crop productivity.39 Further, crop insurance premiums are 
themselves highly subsidized. A 2016 analysis of crop insurance 
34  See Peter Rosset, The Multiple Functions and Benefits of Small Farm Agriculture in 
the Context of Global Trade Negotiations, 43 Development 77, 81 (2000); see generally 
Linda Lobao & Curtis W. Stofferahn, The Community Effects of Industrialized 
Farming: Social Science Research and Challenges to Corporate Farming Laws, 25 
Agric. & Human Values 219 (2008) (focusing on the consequences of farmland 
consolidation and industrialized agriculture for rural communities).
35  See Rosset, supra note 34, at 78-79.
36  Id. at 80-81; Lobao & Stofferahn, supra note 34, at 226-28.
37  U.S. Dep’t of Agric., supra note 15, at 94, 100 tbl. 65.
38  Dennis Shields, Cong. Research Serv., Federal Crop Insurance: Background 2 
(2015), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R40532.pdf. 
39  Id.
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policies, for example, found that farmers realized an annual 
average return of 120 percent on their policies between 2000 
and 2014.40 These extraordinarily high crop insurance premium 
subsidies have increased agricultural emissions by incentivizing 
agricultural production on marginal land, while also increasing 
land consolidation.41 
Crop insurance should do the opposite. Rather than 
encouraging cultivation of marginal lands, which is financially 
risky, and discouraging climate-friendly practices such as cover 
crops, Congress should create financial incentives for practices 
that will make the system more secure. It should make soil 
health—of which soil carbon content is a key factor—a criterion 
in determining insurance premiums, rewarding those who act as 
good stewards of the land. This would discourage planting on poor 
quality land (which is often the most ecologically important) and 
create financial incentives for practices that both reduce climate 
change and improve resilience to droughts, floods, and the like, 
thus reducing the very risks that the program seeks to address. 
All this would, in turn, reduce federal expenditures.42 Congress 
should also ensure that USDA and researchers have access to 
soil health data, allowing them to quantify the impact of different 
sustainability practices on soil health.43
4.  Turn the Conservation Reserve Program into a true 
land retirement program
The Conservation Reserve Program (“CRP”) pays farmers 
for taking environmentally sensitive land out of production for 10-
40  Bruce A. Babcock, Envtl. Working Grp., Crop Insurance: A Lottery That’s 
a Sure Bet 3 (2016), https://static.ewg.org/reports/2016/federal_crop_insurance_
lottery/EWG_CropInsuranceLottery.pdf?_ga=2.90653337.2042648376.1516647185-
417038531.1514752376. 
41  See, e.g., Daniel Sumner & Carl Zulauf, Council on Food, Agric. & Res. Econ., 
Economic & Environmental Effects of Agricultural Insurance Programs 
(2012), http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/bitstream/156622/2/Sumner-Zulauf_Final.pdf. 
42  See Joshua D. Woodard & Leslie J. Verteramo-Chiu, Efficiency Impacts of Utilizing 
Soil Data in the Pricing of the Federal Crop Insurance Program, 99 Amer. J. Agric. 
Econ. 757, 758 (2017).
43  Id. at 769.
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15 years.44 Out of the three main conservation programs, Congress 
gave it the largest allocation in the 2014 bill, resulting in roughly 
$1.8 billion annually.45 USDA estimated that CRP sequestered 
over 43 million metric tons of carbon dioxide emissions in 
2014, mitigating about 7 percent of agriculture’s greenhouse gas 
emissions that year.46 This is misleading, however, since many 
producers bring their CRP acres back into production after their 
contracts expire, quickly releasing any carbon stored during the 
contract’s term. A 2016 study found that expired CRP land was 
10 times more likely to be converted into crop production than to 
be shifted into other set-aside conservation programs.47 Between 
2007 and 2014, for example, an estimated 15.8 million acres 
previously protected by CRP—at a cost of $7.3 billion—were 
returned to agricultural production.48 Researchers have also found 
that some farmers compensate for the loss of production on CRP 
lands by converting marginal land to crop production.49
44  Conservation Reserve Program, U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Farm Service Agency, 
https://www.fsa.usda.gov/programs-and-services/conservation-programs/
conservation-reserve-program/ (last visited Apr. 28, 2018).
45  See Cong. Budget Office, CBO’s March 2015 Baseline for Farm Programs 26 
(2015), https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/recurringdata/51317-2015-03-usda.pdf 
[hereinafter CBO’s March 2015 Baseline for Farm Programs]; Cong. Budget 
Office, CBO’s March 2016 Baseline for Farm Programs 26 (2016), https://www.
cbo.gov/sites/default/files/recurringdata/51317-2016-03-usda.pdf [hereinafter CBO’s 
March 2016 Baseline for Farm Programs]; Cong. Budget Office, CBO’s June 
2017 Baseline for Farm Programs 28 (2017), https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/
recurringdata/51317-2017-06-usda.pdf [hereinafter CBO’s June 2017 Baseline for 
Farm Programs]. 
46  U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Farm Serv. Agency Strategic Plan: Fiscal Year 2016-
2018 Update 25, 28, https://www.fsa.usda.gov/Assets/USDA-FSA-Public/usdafiles/
AboutFSA/fsa-strategic-plan-2016-2018.pdf. 
47  Philip E. Morefield et al., Grasslands, Wetlands, and Agriculture: The Fate of Land 
from the Conservation Reserve Program in the Midwestern United States, 11 Envtl. 
Res. Letters 1, 5 (2016).
48  Envtl. Working Grp., supra note at 27 at 7.
49  See JunJie Wu, Slippage Effects of the Conservation Reserve Program, 82 J. Agric. 
Economics 979, 990 (2000) (finding that for each 100 acres of land enrolled in CRP, 
another 20 acres were put into production); David A. Fleming, Slippage Effects of 
Land Based Policies: Evaluating the Conservation Reserve Program Using Satellite 
Imagery, 93 Papers Regional Sci. S167, S176 (2013) (observing varying rates of 
slippage according to land cover using satellite data); Nancy Leathers & Lisa M.B. 
Harrington, Effectiveness of Conservation Reserve Programs and Land “Slippage” in 
Southwestern Kansas, 52 Professional Geographer 83, 83-93 (2004) (finding that 
slippage greatly reduce CRP’s effectiveness in Kansas). Contra Michael J. Roberts 
& Shawn Bucholtz, Slippage in The Conservation Reserve Program or Spurious 
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In order to effectively reduce agricultural emissions, 
Congress should restructure CRP in two ways. First, satellite 
imagery and other modern technology should be used to identify 
the most sensitive lands (such as former wetlands or stream beds), 
which should then be prioritized. Second, the CRP should provide 
farmers with either permanent easements or 30-year easements 
that are linked to permanent set-asides, effectively expanding the 
current Agricultural Conservation Easement Program (“ACEP”).50 
Farmers who complete a 30-year easement contract, for example, 
could be given an incentive to sign a permanent contract to 
keep the land from being cultivated. This would change CRP 
to a program that both supplements the incomes of farmers and 
provides sustained water quality and climate benefits. 
 
  5.  End EQIP subsidies for industrial operations
The Environmental Quality Incentives Program (“EQIP”) 
offers farmers funding and technical assistance for developing 
and implementing single conservation practices.51
In recent years, Congress has provided EQIP with 
approximately $1.4 billion annually.52 More than a quarter of 
EQIP payments went to support waste storage facilities in large-
scale animal production facilities (legally termed “concentrated 
animal feeding operations” or “CAFO”s) and irrigation systems. 
Doing so has the effect of subsidizing large-scale, environmentally 
degrading practices.53 
Correlation? A Comment, 87 Amer. J. Agric. Economics 244, 250 (2005) (finding no 
evidence of slippage using an alternative model).
50  USDA currently offers farmers long-term and permanent easements through ACEP, 
but funding for its component initiatives has been cut substantially in recent years and 
the program now receives between 8 to 15 percent of CRP’s funding annually. See 
Cong. Budget Office, supra note 45. 
51  Environmental Quality Incentives Program, U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Natural 
Resources Conservation Service, https://www.nrcs.usda.gov/wps/portal/nrcs/
main/national/programs/financial/eqip/ (last visited Apr. 28, 2018).
52  See, e.g., Cbo’s June 2017 Baseline For Farm Programs, supra note 45.
53  See, e.g., Andrew Martin, In The Farm Bill, A Creature from the Black Lagoon, 
N.Y. Times (Jan. 13, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/13/business/13feed.
html (suggesting that the program’s name should be changed to the “Factory Farm 
Incentive Program”); Tom Laskaway, Stop The Environmental Subsidy for Factory 
Farms, Grist (Apr. 17, 2009), http://grist.org/article/stop-the-environmental-subsidy-
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When Congress created EQIP in 1996, it required that 
at least 50 percent of the program’s total funding go toward 
livestock operations.54 However, it excluded large confined 
livestock operations,55 and limited payments to a maximum of 
$50,000 in most cases,56 ensuring that EQIP funds would benefit 
smaller operations. In the 2002 Farm Bill, Congress eliminated the 
restriction against large confined livestock operations and raised 
the payment cap to $450,000,57 where it currently stands.58 As a 
result, waste storage facilities for CAFOs received a larger share 
of payments—over $100 million—than any other single practice 
supported by EQIP.59 Since CAFOs depend on the production 
of vast amounts of grain—the production of which causes 
significant air and water pollution—and concentrate manure 
in ways that create further air and water pollution, supporting 
CAFOs effectively subsidizes a greenhouse gas-intensive form 
of animal production that also undermines rural economies and 
animal welfare.60 
The largest share of EQIP payments—$181 million 
in 201661—however, goes to a bundle of practices designed 
to improve irrigation systems, such as the installation of new 
for-factory-farms/; CAFOs and Cover Crops: A Closer Look at 2015 EQIP Dollars, 
Nat’l Sustainable Agric. Coal. Blog (Nov. 20, 2015), http://sustainableagriculture.
net/blog/fy15-general-eqip-update/.
54  Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-127, 
§1241(2), 110 Stat. 996-97 (1996).
55  Id.
56  Id.
57  Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-171, §§ 
1240B-1240G, 116 Stat. 254-57 (2002).
58  The cap was lowered to $300,000 in the 2008 Farm Bill, but was ultimately raised 
back to $450,000 in the 2014. Farm Bill. Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008, 
Pub. L. No. 110-234, § 2508, 122 Stat. 923, 1063 (2008); Agricultural Act of 2014, Pub. 
L. 113-79, §2206, 128 Stat. 649, 730 (2014) (amending § 1240G).
59  Melissa Bailey & Kathleen Merrigan, Rating Sustainability: An Opinion Survey 
of National Conservation Practices Funded Through the Environmental Quality 
Incentives Program, 65 J. Soil & Water Conservation 21A, 23A (2010). 
60  Carrie Hribar, Nat’l Assoc. of Local Boards of Health, Understanding 
Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations and Their Impact on Communities 
7-10 (2010), https://www.cdc.gov/nceh/ehs/docs/understanding_cafos_nalboh.pdf. 
61  Nat’l Sustainable Agric. Coal., supra note 18, at 52.
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irrigation pipelines or reservoirs.62 Instead of using EQIP funding 
just to improve the efficiency of irrigation, however, farmers 
often use their savings to expand irrigated crop production, 
switch to more water-intensive crops, or both.63 This leads to land 
conversion, a major source of greenhouse gas emissions.64
Farmers deserve support for installing environmentally 
friendly infrastructure, but EQIP must be better tailored. Congress 
should prohibit funding for new and expanding CAFOs. It should 
also contractually bar operators receiving EQIP payments for 
water conservation from expanding irrigated crop production. 
The resulting savings should be redirected to practices used 
in sustainable systems, ensuring long-term benefits to the 
environment and climate. 
6.  Focus the Conservation Stewardship Program on 
environmental benefits
The Conservation Stewardship Program (“CSP”) is an 
incentive-based working lands program, designed to make active 
farms more environmentally friendly.65 Farmers participating 
62  See Environmental Quality Incentives Program (EQIP) practice suite payments in 
the United States, 1997-2015, Envtl. Working Grp., https://conservation.ewg.org/
eqip_practice_suite.php?fips=00000&regionname=theUnitedStates (last visited Apr. 
29, 2018) (between 1997 and 2015 over $1.6 billion went to fund irrigation systems 
through EQIP). 
63  See generally Frank Ward & Manuel Pulido-Velazquez, Water Conservation in 
Irrigation Can Increase Water Use, 105 Proc. Nat’l Acad. Sci. U.S. Am. 18215 
(2008); Lisa Pfeiffer & C.-Y. Cynthia Lin, Does Efficient Irrigation Technology Lead 
to Reduced Groundwater Extraction? Empirical Evidence, 67 J. Evnt’l Econ. Mgmt. 
189 (2014).
64  See Emily Cassidy, Envtl. Working Grp., Ethanol’s Broken Promise: Using 
Less Corn Ethanol Reduces Greenhouse Gas Emissions 4 (Nils Bruzelius ed. 
2014), http://www.pnas.org/content/pnas/105/47/18215.full.pdf. The Environmental 
Working Group, for instance, estimates that the conversion of wetlands to farmland 
between 2008 and 2012 resulted in greenhouse gas emissions totaling 25 to 74 
million metric tons of carbon dioxide equivalent annually. Id. Others have studied the 
conversion of native grasslands to farmland, in large part to supply corn to ethanol 
plants, and similarly found significant soil carbon losses. Tyler Lark et al., Cropland 
Expansion Outpaces Agricultural and Biofuel Policies in the United States, 10 Envtl. 
Res. Letters 1, 5 (2015).
65  EQIP, in contrast, is a cost-share working lands conservation program. CSP may 
be merged with EQIP in the upcoming farm bill, however, a similar performance-
based payment program will likely remain in some form. Conservation Stewardship 
Program (CSP), U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Natural Resources Conservation Service, 
https://www.nrcs.usda.gov/wps/portal/nrcs/main/oh/programs/financial/csp/ (last 
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in CSP enroll their entire operation in a contract to plan and 
adopt comprehensive conservation measures. While CSP has the 
smallest budget of the three main conservation programs—it has 
received about $1.1 billion annually since the last farm bill66—
CSP is the largest USDA conservation program on an acreage 
basis.67 Unfortunately, recent changes to CSP have deemphasized 
environmental considerations in USDA’s application and payment 
determinations.
Congress should require that CSP payments encourage 
practices with the most environmental and climate benefits. Now, 
payments for many CSP practices that increase crop diversity 
and soil health, such as Resource Conserving Crop Rotations 
(“RCCR”s) and Soil Health Crop Rotations, are actually lower 
than payments for standard enhancements.68 Congress should 
strengthen the CSP sustainability standards for participation; 
increase the importance of environmental benefits in the 
application process; and raise payment rates for practices that 
provide the greatest climate benefits.
Transforming the farm bill
Agricultural land, which covers more than 60 percent of 
the continental United States, 69 is capable of producing a number 
of public goods in addition to agricultural commodities, including 
environmental goods, such as biodiversity, water quality, 
and climate stability, and social goods such as rural vitality, 
animal welfare, and food security.70 The farm bill should move 
beyond its traditional focus on the production of agricultural 
visited Apr. 28, 2018).
66  See Cbo’s June 2017 Baseline For Farm Programs, supra note 45.
67  Conservation Stewardship Program (CSP), supra note 65.
68  See U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Natural Resources Conservation Service, Payment 
Schedule Handbook, Part C § 600.13(F) (2016), https://directives.sc.egov.usda.gov/
OpenNonWebContent.aspx?content=40186.wba. 
69  Cynthia Nickerson et al., U.S. Dep’t. of Agric., Econ. Res. Serv., Major Uses 
of Land in the United States, 2007 4 (2011), https://www.ers.usda.gov/webdocs/
publications/44625/11159_eib89_2_.pdf?v=41055. 
70  Francesco Vanni, Agriculture and Public Goods: The Role of Collective Action 
119 (Springer 2014).
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commodities and treat agriculture’s other public goods with equal 
consideration.71 In addition to the specific changes recommended 
above, Congress should develop a robust program to pay farmers 
for these important stewardship services. 
The federal government currently incentivizes farms to 
grow crops that are used, in a highly inefficient manner, to produce 
corn ethanol, sweeteners, and highly processed food products.72 
Why not encourage farms to produce what the country needs 
more of? Congress should develop a program to pay farmers 
for permanent carbon sequestration, which measures would also 
protect water quality and quantity. The farm safety net should 
not just enrich the largest farms, but protect the environment, 
mitigate climate change, grow healthy food, and strengthen rural 
communities. Decarbonizing the farm bill would not only help 
stabilize our climate, but would also transform rural America into 
a healthier, more sustainable, and equitable place.
71  This would not necessarily result in a decline in production or an increase in land 
use, although funding for research in agroecological methods would need to be 
increased in order to maintain productivity.
72  While the production of these commodity crops may be efficient when measured 
by inputs (such as labor) or yield, their use is grossly inefficient when human needs, 
such as nutritious food, are considered. Lehner & Rosenberg, supra note 18, at 10853. 
A 2013 study found that 67 percent of calories and 80 percent of protein in crops 
produced in the United States are diverted to animal feed. Emily Cassidy et al., 
Redefining Agricultural Yields: From Tonnes to People Nourished Per Hectare, 8 
Envtl. Res. Letters 1, 4 (2013). An additional 6 percent of both calories and protein 
of U.S. crops were diverted to a biofuel production—a share that has likely increased 
significantly since the enactment of the Renewable Fuel Standard. Id. Finally, an 
estimated 75 percent of the average American’s diet comes from processed or ultra-
processed foods, which are low in nutritional quality. Jennifer Poti et al., Is the Degree 
of Food Processing and Convenience Linked With the Nutritional Quality of Foods 
Purchased by US Households, 101 Am. J. Clinical Nutrition 1251, 1251 (2015). 
Some researchers have started to refer to this diet as a “commodity-based diet” due 
to its reliance on commodity crop production. See David Ludwig, Commentary, 
Technology, Diet, and the Burden of Chronic Disease, 305 JAMA 1352, 1352 (2011).
